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Abstract—The consensus protocol named proof of work (PoW)
is widely applied by cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin. Although
security of a PoW cryptocurrency is always the top priority, it
is threatened by mining attacks like selfish mining. Researchers
have proposed many mining attack models with one attacker, and
optimized the attacker’s strategy. During these mining attacks,
an attacker pursues a higher relative revenue (RR) by wasting
a large amount of computational power of the honest miners at
the cost of a small amount of computational power of himself.
In this paper, we propose a mining attack model with two
phases: the original system and the multi-attacker system. It is the
first model to provide both theoretical and quantitative analysis
of mining attacks with two attackers. We explain how the original
system turns into the multi-attacker system by introducing two
attackers: the internal attacker and the external attacker. If both
attackers take the attacking strategy selfish mining, the RR of
the internal attacker in multi-attacker system will drop by up to
31.9% compared with his RR in original system. The external
attacker will overestimate his RR by up to 44.6% in multi-
attacker system. Unexpected competitions, auctions between
attackers and overestimation of attackers’ influence factor are
three main causes of both attackers’ dropping RR. We propose
a mining strategy named Partial Initiative Release (PIR) which is
a semi-honest mining strategy in multi-attacker system. In some
specific situations, PIR allows the attacker to get more block
reward by launching an attack in multi-attacker system.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Mining, Mining attack, Selfish min-
ing.
I. INTRODUCTION
NOWADAYS, most traditional payments on the Internetare based on trusted third parties. The trust based pay-
ment model has some shortcomings which make completely
non-reversible transactions impossible [1]. In the past decade,
public’s interest has focused on decentralized cryptocurren-
cies based on cryptographic proof. These cryptocurrencies,
presented by Bitcoin which is the first fully decentralized cryp-
tocurrency [18], rely on blockchain technology to guarantee
their security. Generally speaking, a blockchain is an open
ledger used to store and maintain a list of record. Its consensus
protocol guarantees that previous data written in a blockchain
is irreversible and consistent to all users. A series of consensus
protocol such as proof of work (PoW), proof of stake (PoS)
and practical Byzantine fault tolerance (PBFT) are applied to
cryptocurrencies. Proof of work, applied by Bitcoin, takes the
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largest market share. In 2016, proof-of-work blockchains take
about 90% of the market [9]. In a proof-of-work blockchain
such as Bitcoin, the participants are required to generate PoWs
by solving cryptographic puzzles when they are finding blocks.
The one who tries to generate new blocks are called miners,
and the process to find a new block is called mining. When a
miner finds a new block, he propagates his solution to other
miners. All other miners confirm his solution and beginning
solving a new crytographic puzzle [1]. To lower the variance
of a solo miner’s revenue, a group of miners are organized to
form a mining pool.
A miner or a mining pool with a large amount of compu-
tational power may threaten the blockchain. The most basic
requirement for a proof-of-work blockchain is that the records
in the blockchain cannot be modified. But a well-known
attacking strategy named 51% attack can revert the transaction
records in a proof-of-work blockchain [1], [11]. 51% attack
requires the attacker to control more than 50% of the network’s
computational power. In 2018, a proof-of-work cryptocurrency
called Bitcoin Gold suffered 51% attack. 51% attack requires a
large amount of computational power and breaks the reliability
of a blockchain. Generally speaking, only those attackers
whose aim is to revert transaction records will launch a 51%
attack.
For these attackers, block reward can be one of their aims.
In a proof-of-work blockchain, the ideal case is that a miner
or a mining pool with α fraction of computational power in
the blockchain should gain α fraction of block reward in a
long period of time. But many studies have indicated that an
attacker in a proof-of-work blockchain can get more share of
block reward than he deserves through some strategies. The
most well-known one is selfish mining presented by Eyal and
Sirer in 2014 [2]. In May 2018, a Japanese proof-of-work
cryptocurrency was hit by selfish mining attack and the attack
has caused roughly $90,000 in damages.
Like Bitcoin Gold and Monacoin, Bitcoin is a proof-of-
work based powered blockchain as well. A statistic from
blockchain.info indicates that, in 2017, the mining difficulty
which is approximately proportional to the whole computa-
tional power in Bitcoin has increased by four times. The huge
computational power in Bitcoin makes it unrealistic to launch
a 51% attack to Bitcoin. But the threshold of the computational
power to launch a selfish mining attack is far lower. Another
statistic from blockchain.info demonstrate that, in 2018, the
price of Bitcoin has dropped by more than 70%. The dropping
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2price may result in the fleeing of computational power in Bit-
coin which can lower the threshold of computational power to
launch a selfish mining attack. Under this situation, Bitcoin has
to face the fact that it might suffer from selfish mining attack
in the future. Many former studies [4], [8], [18] have presented
attacking strategis towards a proof-of-work blockchain which
have better performance than selfish mining. They put their
emphasis on the optimization of one single attacker’s strategy.
Former studies do not consider the case with two or more
attackers. We assumes that the number of attackers may
increase to two. In this paper, we establish a mining attack
model of a proof-of-work blockchain with two attackers. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first effort on system-
atically modeling a mining attack model with two attackers.
We explain why the second attacker may occur by dividing
attackers into two types: the internal attacker and the external
attacker. We define the proof-of-work cryptocurrency system
which consists of the honest miner and internal attacker as
original system, and the system which consists of the honest
miner, the internal attacker and the honest miner as multi-
attacker system. Our work reveals that the internal attacker
weakens the original system, so the original system is more
likely to be attacked by the external attacker. And in multi-
attacker system, both external attacker and internal attacker’s
revenue do not meet their expectation. This paper makes the
following contributions:
Contribution 1: Establishing a proof-of-work blockchain
model with internal attacker and external attacker. We pro-
pose a new proof-of-work blockchain model, which consists
of two attackers. The decision making process, the mining
behavior, the state transition and the attacking strategies of
the attackers are different from the former blockchain models
with one single attacker.
Contribution 2: Theoretical and quantitative analysis on
the conditions that external attacker may occur. Our anal-
ysis reveals the relationship between the computational power
of the internal attacker and the degree that the original system’s
computational power is weaken. We prove that the external
attacker may attack the original system if his computational
power is in a certain scope.
Contribution 3: A new attacking strategy named Partial
Initiative Release (PIR). We have proved that both the
internal attacker and the external attacker may face the fact
that they do not gain as much revenue as their expectation
in the multi-attacker system. We discuss the Catfish Effect
in the multi-attacker system. We propose a new attacking
strategy called Partial Initiative Release (PIR) which is the
countermeasure for the internal attacker after he notices the
existence of the external attacker. Our simulations demonstrate
that internal attacker with strategy PIR can gain more revenue
than the external attacker with strategy selfish mining.
The previous version of this paper has appeared in [17].
This paper has extended and improved the previous version.
The most important extensions includes distinguishing the type
of attackers and the phase of our mining attack model (Section
III. A), theoretical analysis and quantitative analysis on how
internal attacker weakens the original system (Section IV),
theoretical analysis and quantitative analysis on the condition
that the external attacker may attack the original system
(Section V), discussion on the Catfish Effect in multi-attacker
system (Section VI. C). Compared with the previous version
[17], distinguishing the type of attackers and the phase of
our mining attacker model better explains why and how
two attackers occur, newly added theoretical and quantitative
analysis provides more solid proofs, and the discussion on
Catfish Effect explains more clearly why the attacks need to
switch their attacking strategy in multi-attacker system.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows: We begin by
introducing the basic concepts of proof-of-work blockchain
in Section II. In Section III we introduce our proof-of-work
blockchain model including attackers’ state space, action space
and assumptions in our analysis. In Section IV we present the
theoretical and quantitative analysis about how the internal
attacker weakens the original system. In Section V, we provide
with the condition that the external attacker may attack the
original system. We also illustrate the fact that the external
attacker will fail to gain as much revenue as he expects. In
Section VI, we describe the Catfish Effect in multi-attacker
system and propose the PIR strategy for the internal attacker.
In Section VII, we conclude our paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we describe some basic concepts of Bitcoin
and some attacking strategies in Bitcoin including selfish
mining since Bitcoin is the most well-known and most typical
instance of proof-of-work blockchain. The basic concepts and
attacking strategies are also suitable for other proof-of-work
blockchain instances.
A. Basis of Bitcoin
1) Miner and Mining Process: In Bitcoin, the miners are
the participants who are working on finding new blocks.
The process for the miners to find new blocks are called
mining process. In the blockchain of Bitcoin, the block header
identifies each block [1]. A block header consists of the hash
of previous block header, the Merkle root of the transactions
stored in the block and a nonce. The miners’ work is to select
the transactions which has not been stored in previous blocks
can generate nonces. If the hash value of all data in the block
header is lower than a specific threshold t, then the miner can
propagate the new block found by him to the Bitcoin network.
Other miners will accept the new block after verification. The
mining process of the miner seriously rely on the miner’s
computational power. In Bitcoin, the threshold t is adjusted
about every two weeks [1]. The more computational power is
in the Bitcoin system, the lower the threshold is and the more
difficult it is to find new blocks.
For a solo miner, he has to wait for a long time which
is not intolerable before he finds a new block [18]. To gain
3block revenue in a more stable way, a group of solo miners
organize a mining pool. Mining pools benefit their members,
but increases uncertainty to the whole system. Once the pool
manager of a mining pool wants to gain more revenue than
the share he deserves, with a large amount of computational
power, he can easily launch mining attacks. The largest pool
in Bitcoin history has the computational power which exceeds
40% of the computational power in Bitcoin system [8].
2) Honest Miners and Attackers: Honest miners in Bitcoin
follow Bitcoin protocol. They immediately propagate their
newly found blocks to the Bitcoin network and accept the
longest blockchain as their main chain. If there exists a fork
in blockchain, the honest miners accept the block they receive
first.
Solo miners and mining pools can be the attackers in Bitcoin
and act in a different way. Some typical attacking tricks are
[2], [3], [5], [8], [13]:
1) Denial of propagating the blocks which is found by others
to other miners.
2) Denial of immediately propagating the blocks found by
themselves to the Bitcoin network.
3) Denial of accepting the longest chain instead of their own
chain as the main chain.
The behavior of the attackers includes but is not limit to the
tricks above. An attacker can adjust their behavior and choose
which tricks to be used according to his attacking strategy.
3) Forks in Blockchain: A fork in Bitcoin occurs when two
miners find and propagate their newly found block at roughly
the same time. Due to the information propagation delay in
Bitcoin network [3], [14], part of honest miners receive and
verify one branch of the fork first while other honest miners
receive and verify the other branch of the fork. This kind
of forks is randomly generated and will be eliminated when
the next block is found so that one branch is extended and
accepted by all the honest miner while the other branch is
staled. Gervais [7] and Decker [3] estimate the probability
that a randomly generated fork occurs in Bitcoin. Both two
works suggest that the randomly generated fork rate of Bitcoin
ranges from 0.41% [7] to 1.7% [3] according the information
propagation in Bitcoin.
An attacker can generate a fork intentionally. In mining
attacks including selfish mining [2], [4], [8], [18], attacker
will intentionally generate a fork and provoke a competition
in the blockchain. Intentionally generated forks always means
the waste of computational power.
B. Mining Attacks
1) Selfish Mining: Bitcoin, as the proof-of-work cryptocur-
rency, is designed under the assumption that as long as
the majority of the hashpower is honest, Bitcoin’s safety is
guaranteed [1]. But this assumption has been overthrown by
selfish mining proposed by Eyal and Sirer [2]. Selfish mining
allows the adversarial miners or mining pools to get more
revenue than they deserve. The attackers do not immediately
release the blocks found by themselves. They do not accept
the longest chain as their main chain as long as they are
holding some unreleased blocks. An attacker with 33% of the
computational power of Bitcoin system can ensure that he can
earn extra revenue (more than 33% of the revenue of the entire
system). The threshold can even lower to 0 with the increase
of information propagation delay among the honest miners.
2) Optimization of Selfish Mining: After Eyal and Sirer’s
work, many researchers are focusing on optimization of selfish
mining. Sapirshtein’s work [4] and Nayak’s work [8] extend
the attackers’ strategy space. Nayak’s work [8] also combines
selfish mining and eclipse attack [6] which is a network-
level attack. Kwon’s work [18] combines selfish mining with
block withholding attack [15]. The former studies present two
possible approaches to optimize selfish mining: Extending the
attacker’s strategy space or combining selfish mining with
other mining attacks. The former works only consider the
attacking scenes with a single attacker.
3) Methods to Evaluate a Strategy: Gervais’s work points
out that selfish mining is an irrational strategy in a short
term since it wastes both the attacker’s and honest miner’s
computational power [7]. But in a long term, Bitcoin will lower
the mining difficulty [1]. So for selfish mining and mining
attacks which optimize selfish mining, block reward can not
directly measure the performance of the attacking strategies.
In a short term the attackers’ aim is increasing their fraction
of block reward of the entire system instead of increasing
block reward directly. According to attacker’s aim, relative
revenue (RR) and stale block rate (SBR) are used to evaluate
the performance of a attacking strategy in many former works
[2], [4], [5], [8].
III. ATTACK MODEL
In this section, we introduce our attack model from the fol-
lowing aspects: two phases of our model, attackers’ state and
action , attackers’ decision making process and the evaluation
of attackers’ revenue.
A. Two Phases of Our Model
There are two attackers in our model: the internal attacker
and the external attacker. Either a solo miner or a mining
pool can act as an attacker. The honest miners, no matter
whether they are solo miners or mining pools, accept the
same main chain when there are no forks in the blockchain.
When no forks exist, the honest miners can be seen as an
whole honest entity. Otherwise, the computational power of
the honest miners splits due to information propagation delay.
We define the first phase of our model as the original system.
The original system consists of the internal attacker and the
honest miner. In the original system, internal attacker can
launch a selfish mining attack. After the attack, the original
system can be considered as a selfish mining model with one
single attacker.
4The second phase of our model is defined as the multi-
attacker system. The multi-attacker system consists of the
internal attacker, the external attacker and the honest miner.
The multi-attacker system results from the external attacker’s
selfish mining attack against original system after internal
attacker’s attack.
B. State and Action
1) Attackers’ state: Each attacker’s state contains the infor-
mation of the attacker in the blockchain. The attackers make
decisions based on their state. Our attacking model, with two
attackers, considers some special states which do not exist in
those models with a single attacker. The following information
should be included in the state:
1) The attacker’s lead: The private chain of an attacker
consists of the main chain accepted by the attacker and
the unreleased blocks. We define an attacker’s lead as
the height of the attacker’s private chain minus the main
chain accepted by the honest miner.
2) Whether the attacker is in a competition or not: When
an attacker intentionally generates forks in Bitcoin, it is
possible for him to be involved in a competition. Whether
the attacker is in a competition or not determines his next
action.
3) If there are another fork in the blockchain: Another
fork means the fork which is not generated by the
attacker randomly or intentionally. If other miners release
a new block at roughly the same time, there will be an
competition in the blockchain which the attacker is not
engaged in.
We use the notation in selfish mining attack model to
represent the attacker’s state. S = i (i = 0, 1, 2 . . .) means that
the attacker’s lead is i and there is no forks in the blockchain.
S = 0′ represents that the attacker is in a competition with
other miners.
The notation of the attacker’s state above is designed for
the attacking model with a single attacker. It cannot cover all
situations in our model. We define S = i′′ (i = 0, 1, 2 . . .) to
cover the situations that there is a fork in the blockchain, but
the attacker is not involved in the competition.
2) Attacker’s action: Attacker’s action determines whether
the attacker should release his blocks or not and how the
attacker release his blocks. Similar to attacker’s state, we use
the notation of attacker’s action in selfish mining attack model.
But the meaning of notations is adjusted so as to be suitable
for our model with two attackers. The attacker have five basic
actions:
Hold: The attacker do not release any blocks or select a new
main chain.
Match: The attacker releases one or n of his unreleased
blocks so that the attacker’s released chain can catch up the
other miner’s chain. Override: The attacker releases two or n
of his unreleased blocks so that the attacker’s released chain
can exceed the other miner’s chain just right.
Adopt: The attacker gives up on his private chain and select
the longest chain as his main chain.
Release: The attacker extend his released chain by one
block.
C. Decision Process
An attacker needs to decide which basic action he should
take and when to take the basic action based on his state. The
whole process is decision process of the attacker.
Any attacker faces a Markov decision problem: M =
(S,A, P,R) where S is attacker’s state, A is attacker’s action
space which consists of five basic actions, P is the probability
of attacker’s state transition and R is the revenue of attacker’s
action. If we denote the attacker’s previous state as Sprev
and attacker’s current state as Scur, then we have the state
transition equation for the attacker at any state:
Pa(i, j) = P (Scur = j | Sprev = i , Actionprev = a) (1)
The processing of finding the best response in the next
n steps is usually too complicated for the attacker. Thus
an attacker needs to apply a specific mining attack strategy
(Expressed in the form of a state machine) to find a sub-
optimal response. A mining attack strategy can be considered
as a method to reduce the complexity of finding a solution at
the cost of part of the revenue.
D. Attacker’s Revenue
Attacker’s revenue is used to quantify whether the attacker
can gain extra revenue from his attack. Our model consider all
mining attacks as irrational so that block reward is not suitable
for our model. When quantifying the attacker’s or the honest
miner’s revenue, we use stale block rate (SBR) and relative
revenue (RR).
A miner’s SBR shows how much computational power of
the miner is wasted. Denote the number of blocks which are
found by the miner and accepted by all honest miners as
Numac. And denote the number of blocks which are found by
the miner and not accepted by all honest miners as Numnac.
The miner’s SBR can be calculated as:
SBR =
Numac
Numac +Numnac
(2)
A miner’s RR shows whether a miner receives as much
block reward as he deserves. Denote the number of blocks
which are found by other miners and accepted by all honest
miners as Numoac. The miner’s RR can be calculated as:
RR =
Numac
Numac +Numoac
(3)
E. Our assumptions
We have made the following five assumptions in our anal-
ysis:
1) There are three participants in our model: The honest
miner, the internal attacker and the external attacker.
5The internal attacker mines in the original system from
the beginning, and he decides to starts selfish mining
attack. The external attacker joins into the system after
the internal attacker’s attack.
2) The honest miner, the internal attacker and the external
attacker can either be a solo miner or a mining pool. We
make the assumption that honest miner’s computational
power is always greater than the internal attacker’s and
the external attacker’s.
3) We do not consider the mining attack strategy which do
not intentionally create forks, such as Eclipse attack and
block withholding attack.
4) The total computational power of the honest miner, the
internal attacker and the external attacker is normalized
which means that the total computational power of the
multi-attacker system is 1. Meanwhile, we assume that
the total computational power will not change any more
after the external attacker’s participation.
5) Both the internal attacker and the external attacker are
selfish mining attackers at the beginning. After noticing
the existing of the external attacker, the internal attacker
will take some countermeasures. During their attack,
except the forks intentionally created by them, we do
not consider the randomly generated forks since the fork
rate is negligible.
IV. ORIGINAL SYSTEM
In this section, we will demonstrate how the internal at-
tacker’s attack weakens the computation power of the original
system which consists of the honest miner and the internal
attacker from two aspect: Theoretical analysis and simulation.
In this section, the internal attacker launches a selfish mining
attack.
A. Theoretical Analysis
The relevant parameters are as follows:
• α: Computational power of the honest miner the honest
miner.
• β1: Computational power of the internal attacker.
• β2: Computational power of the external attacker.
• τ1: Probability that the internal attacker’s chain win the
competition when the internal attacker is competing with
the honest miner or the external attacker.
• τ2: Probability that the external attacker’s chain win the
competition when the external attacker is competing with
the honest miner or the internal attacker.
• γ1: The fraction of honest miner that helps the internal
attacker when the internal attacker’s chain is competing
with others.
• γ2: The fraction of honest miner that helps the external
attacker when the external attacker’s chain is competing
with others.
• γh: The fraction of honest miner that helps the attackers
when there is a competition.
First, we normalize the computational of the original system
first. In the original system, the fraction of the computational
power of internal attacker is: β′ = β1β1+α , and the fraction of
computation power of the honest miner is: α′ = αβ1+α .
To show how the internal attacker weakens the original
system, we classify the case based on the internal attacker’s
state as shown in Fig.1. In the first case, the internal attacker
is at state 0 with the probability Pr(Sβ1 = 0). In the second
case, the internal attacker is at state 0’ with the probability
Pr(Sβ1 = 0
′). In this case, the internal attacker has the
probability τ1 to win the competition, and the probability that
the internal attacker finds the next block in the competition is
β′. Note that, β′ is not necessarily equal to τ1. Typically, due
to the information propagation delay and some other factors,
part of the honest miner’s computational power will help the
internal attacker in the competition, which means that τ1 is
usually greater than β′. In the third case, the internal attacker
is at stage 1 with the probability Pr(Sβ1 = 1).In the forth
case, the internal attacker is at state 2 with the probability
Pr(Sβ1 = 2). In the final case, the internal attacker has the
state that greater than two with the probability Pr(Sβ1 ≥ 3).
Lemma 4.1: The probability that the internal attacker is at
any state is:
Pr(Sβ1 = 0) =
β′−2β′2
β′(2β′3−4β′2+1) ,
P r(Sβ1 = 0
′) = α
′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 ,
P r(Sβ1 = k) = (
β′
α′ )
k−1 β′−2β′2
2β′3−4β′2+1 , For k ≥ 1
(4)
Fig. 1: 5 cases
Proof: From the selfish mining state machine, we can
focus on one unique point: Sβ1 = 2. When (Sβ1 ≥ 2), the
internal attacker’s state transition probability from state k to
state k+1 is β′ which is always less than 0.5. Thus, for k ≥ 2,
we have β′Pr(Sβ1 = k) = α
′Pr(Sβ1 = k + 1). In addition,
based on a selfish miner’s behavior when his state is less than
2, we can derive:

Pr(Sβ1 = 0) = Pr(Sβ1 = 0
′) + (α′)Pr(Sβ′ = 2),
P r(Sβ1 = 0
′) = α′Pr(Sβ1 = 1),
P r(Sβ1 = 1) = α
′Pr(Sβ1 = 2),
β′Pr(Sβ1 = k) = α
′Pr(Sβ1 = k + 1), k ≥ 2∑
k=0 Pr(Sβ1 = k) + Pr(Sβ1 = 0
′) = 1
(5)
6With equation(2), we can finally derive equation(1) in Lemma
1. Further, the probability of the five cases we discuued above
is: 
Pr(Case1) = β
′−2β′2
β′(2β′3−4β′2+1) ,
P r(Case2) = α
′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 ,
P r(Case3) = β
′−2β′2
2β′3−4β′2+1 ,
P r(Case4) = β
′(β′−2β′2)
α′(2β′3−4β′2+1) ,
P r(Case5) = β
′2
α′(α′−β′)
β′−2β′2
2β′3−4β′2+1 ,
(6)
Lemma 4.2: The probability that the internal attacker can
extend the length of chain when a new block is found is:
β′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 +
β′α′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 . It is irrelevant to the value of γ1.
Proof: In Case 1, the internal attacker has the probability
1−β′ to remain his state 0 and has the probability β′ to move
on to state 1. In Case 3, the internal attacker has the probability
1−β′ to state 0’ and has the probability β′ to state 2. In Case
5, the internal attacker has the probability 1−β′ to state k−1
and has the probability β′ to state k+1. None of the six results
shown above can result in the increase of the main chain in
Bitcoin.
In Case 2, the internal attacker has the probability τ1 =
β′ + γ1α′ to win the competition and increase the length
of main chain by 1. The probability that the competition is
won by the honest miners who support the internal attacker
is τ1−β
′
τ1
. So the probability that the internal attacker wins the
competition can increase the length of main chain by himself
is actually β
′α′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 . In Case 4, the internal attacker has
the probability β′ to increase his state to 3 which will not
result in the increase of the main chain. So, the probability
that the internal attacker increase the length of main chain in
this case is β
′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 .
From the analysis above, The probability that the internal
attacker can lengthen the length of chain when a new block is
found by original system is: β
′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 +
β′α′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1
Lemma 4.3: The original system’s probability to extend the
main chain when a new block is found is always less than 1.
Proof: For the honest miner, the probability to extend
the main chain is always α′, so the probability that the
original system can extend the main chain when a new block
is found is: α′ + β
′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 +
β′α′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 . Let f(β
′) =
α′ + β
′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 +
β′α′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 − 1.
df(β′)
dβ′ =
−8β′4+9β′2−4β′
4β′6−16β′5−16β′4+4β′3−8β′2+1 ≤ 0 when β′ ranges
from 0 to 12 . f(β
′) ≤ f(0) = 0. Then, we can derive the
inequality:α′ + β
′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 +
β′α′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 ≤ 1
Generally speaking, after the selfish mining attacker
launched by the internal attacker, in a long period of time(in
Bitcoin, about 2 weeks), the computational power of the origi-
nal system is equivalent to a single honest miner with the com-
putational power (α+ β1)(α′ +
β′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 +
β′α′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 ).
The factor ρ = (α′ + β
′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 +
β′α′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 ) shows the
degree that internal attacker the internal attacker weakens the
original system. We name the factor ρ as the shrinkage factor.
B. Quantitative Analysis and Simulation
Theoretically, from the external attacker’s perspective, the
original system’s computational power will shrink by ρ. We
use the definition stale block rate(SBR) to show how much
computational power the internal attacker and honest miner
have lost after the internal attacker launches selfish mining
attack in this simulation. We use a Monte Carlo method to
generate a blockchain with the height 106 blocks by 100 times.
In this simulation, we consider the a simple case: The
external attacker has not joint the whole system yet and the
internal attacker launches a selfish mining attack to the honest
miner.
Fig. 2(a) shows the SBR of the original system, given the
internal attacker’s computational power, when the parameter
γ1 is 0.2 and 0.5 respectively. Fig. 2(a) demonstrates that when
the computational power of the internal attacker(normalized)
increases, the stale block rate of the original system also
increases. The simulation result in Fig. 2(a) also indicates that
the SBR of the original system is irrelevant to the parameter
γ1. This result confirms Lemma 2
Fig. 2(b) shows the shrinkage factor in the simulation. In
this simulation, shrinkage factor is equal to 1−SBR. The more
computational power is wasted due to the internal attacker’s
attack, the less shrinkage factor is.
(a) Stale block rate (b) The shrinkage factor
Fig. 2: The simulation result of the original system
Besides, in theoretic the shrinkage factor can be calculated
as ρ = (α′ + β
′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 +
β′α′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 ) where β
′ = β1β1+α ,
and α′ = αβ1+α . Table I compares the shrinkage factor ρ in the
simulation and the shrinkage factor ρ in theoretic. It indicates
that the shrinkage factor is predictable in the external attacker’s
view.
TABLE I: Comparison between ρ in the simulation and ρ in
theoretic
β′1 ρ in the simulation ρ in theoretic Error
0.25 0.81995 0.82000 0.00597%
0.29 0.79482 0.79479 -0.00461%
0.33 0.76714 0.76718 0.00528%
0.37 0.73471 0.73478 0.00975%
0.41 0.69363 0.69336 -0.03813%
0.45 0.63485 0.63431 -0.08428%
7V. EXISTENCE OF THE EXTERNAL ATTACKER
In this section, according to the results in former section,
we will explain why the external attacker chooses to join this
system after the internal attacker’s attack. In this section, the
internal attacker will not change his strategy. And the external
attacker launches a selfish mining attack.
A. Theoretical Analysis
Suppose that the external attacker is looking for a target
cryptocurrency to attack. The external attacker is also tending
to launch a selfish mining attack to the target cryptocurrency
is he finds one. The external attacker infers the target system’s
computational power αtarget through the increasing speed of
the system’s main chain and its mining difficulty. Meanwhile,
we make the assumption that the external attacker considers
all the miners in her target system honest.
The external attacker, with the computational power β2
and the target system with inferred computational power
αtarget construct the multi-attacker system with the total
computational power β2 + αtarget. Similarly. we normalize
the computational power of this multi-attacker system. The
fraction of computational power of the external attacker is:
β′′ = β2β2+αtarget , and the fraction of computational power of
the honest miner in the target system is: α′′ = αtargetβ2+αtarget .
Similar to the former section, we can calculate the probability
that the external attacker is at a certain state:
Pr(Sβ2 = 0) =
β′′−2β′′2
β′′(2β′′3−4β′′2+1) ,
P r(Sβ2 = 0
′) = α
′′(β′′−2β′′2)
2β′′3−4β′′2+1 ,
P r(Sβ2 = 1) =
β′′−2β′′2
2β′′3−4β′′2+1 ,
P r(Sβ2 = 2) =
β′′(β′′−2β′′2)
α′′(2β′′3−4β′′2+1) ,
P r(Sβ2 ≥ 3) = β
′′2
α′′(α′′−β′′)
β′′−2β′′2
2β′′3−4β′′2+1 ,
(7)
The expected revenue of the external attacker is:
Rex =
2β′′α′′(β′′ − 2β′′2)
2β′′3 − 4β′′2 + 1 +
(τ2 − β′′)α′′(β′′ − 2β′′2)
2β′′3 − 4β′′2 + 1 +
2β′′(β′′ − 2β′′2)
(2β′′3 − 4β′′2 + 1) +
β′′2
(α′′ − β′′)
β′′ − 2β′′2
2β′′3 − 4β′′2 + 1
(8)
The expected revenue of honest miner in the multi-attacker
system is:
Rothers =
(τ2 − β′′)α′′(β′′ − 2β′′2)
2β′′3 − 4β′′2 + 1 +
2(1− τ2)α′′(β′′ − 2β′′2)
2β′′3 − 4β′′2 + 1 +
α′′(β′′ − 2β′′2)
β′′(2β′′3 − 4β′′2 + 1)
(9)
Lemma 5.1: The external attacker will launch selfish mining
attack to the target system if αtarget <
β2(2−β2−τ2)
1−τ2 . And in
terms of parameter γ2, the computational power of the external
attacker should satisfy: β2 >
αtarget(1−γ2)
2−γ2
Proof: As is indicated in many works, the aim of
a selfish miner is to increase his or her relative revenue.
In the multi-attacker system with the external attacker, his
aim is RexRex+Rothers > β
′′. With α′′ = αtargetβ2+αtarget and
β′′ = β2β2+αtarget , we can derive the inequality αtarget <
β2(2−β2−τ2)
1−τ2 . With the relationship: τ2 = β
′′ + γ2α′′ and the
fact that γ2 can be considered as a constant in a specific
cryptocurrency system for the external attacker, we derive
β2 >
αtarget(1−γ2)
2−γ2 .
Lemma 5.2: The external attacker will launch the selfish
mining attack to the original system which consists of internal
attacker with computational power β1 and the honest miner
with computational power α after the internal attacker’s attack
if the external attacker’s computational power satisfies:
(α+ β1)(α
′ +
β′(β′ − 2β′2)
2β′3 − 4β′2 + 1 +
β′α′(β′ − 2β′2)
2β′3 − 4β′2 + 1)
<
β2(2− β2 − τ2)
1− τ2 ≤ (β1 + α)
(10)
Proof: With Lemma 5.1, we know that if β2(2−β2−τ2)1−τ2 >
(β1 + α), the external attacker would start the selfish mining
attack regardless whether the internal attacker has launched an
attack or not. The external attacker has already set the original
system as the target before the internal attacker launches at-
tack. Similarly, if (α+β1)(α′+
β′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1+
β′α′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 ) >
β2(2−β2−τ2)
1−τ2 , from the external attacker’s perspective, even
if the internal attacker launches selfish mining attack and
weakens the computational power of the original system,
the external attacker’s computation power is still not large
enough. One special case is that (α+β1)(α′+
β′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 +
β′α′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 ) =
β2(2−β2−τ2)
1−τ2 . In this case, the external at-
tacker’s expected revenue in the multi-attacker system is equal
to honest mining. This revenue is not large enough to motivate
the external attacker to join the cryptocurrency system.
If we rewrite the inequality in terms of γ2:
1− γ2
2− γ2 (α+ β1)(α
′ +
β′(β′ − 2β′2)
2β′3 − 4β′2 + 1 +
β′α′(β′ − 2β′2)
2β′3 − 4β′2 + 1)
< β2 ≤ 1− γ2
2− γ2 (β1 + α)
(11)
We can derive the upper bound and the lower bound of the
external attacker’s computational power.
B. Quantitative Analysis and Simulation
In this section, we first consider two cases: In the original
system, the parameter β′ equals to 0.25 and 0.45. According
to Table I, the theoretical shrinkage factor in these two cases
is 0.82 and 0.63431 respectively. In Fig. 3(a) β′ equals 0.25,
and in Fig. 3(b) β′ equals 0.45. In these two figures, Y-axis
represents ratio of the external attacker’s computational power
to the original system’s computational power. Compared with
Fig. 3(b), in Fig. 3(a) the gap between the upper bound and
the lower bound is narrower.
For each β′, there exists a specific lower bound for the
external attacker. In the external attacker’s perspective, as long
8(a) β′ = 0.25
(b)β′ = 0.45
Fig. 3: The upper bound and lower bound of the external
attacker’s computational power.
as the ratio of his computational power to the original system’s
computational power is above the curve of lower bound, he can
always gain extra revenue. This is a reasonable but unrealistic
expectation since the external consider the original system as
an honest entity.
To explain why the external attacker’s expectation is an
unrealistic one, we simulate two specific cases. In the first
case, the parameter β′ equals to 0.25 which results in ρ = 0.82.
We set the computational power of the external attacker as
1
2 × 0.82×αtarget so that it will always satisfy the inequality
1−γ2
2−γ2 (α + β1)(α
′ + β
′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 +
β′α′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 ) < β2 when
β′ = 0.25. After normalization, we get the computational
power of the honest miner, the internal attacker and the
external attacker in the first case which is α = 35.64 , β1 =
1
5.64
and β2 = 1.645.64 respectively. In the second case, the parameter
β′ equals to 0.45 which results in ρ ≈ 0.63431. The external
attacker’s computational power is set as 12×0.63431×αtarget.
After normalization, we get the computational power of the
honest miner, the internal attacker and the external attacker
in the second case which is α ≈ 1126.34 , β1 ≈ 926.34 and
β2 ≈ 6.3426.34 respectively. We use a Monte Carlo method to
generate a blockchain with the height 106 blocks and iterate
for 100 times.
Fig. 4(a) shows the simulation result of the first case and
demonstrates that the external attacker will not earn as much
revenue as he expected. Here, we define relative revenue as
(a)β′ = 0.25
(b)β′ = 0.45
Fig. 4: Comparison between external’s relative revenue in
theoretic and in simulation
Rex
Rex+Rothers
where Rex is the block reward of the external
attacker, and Rothers represents the block reward earned by
the internal attacker and the honest miner. The horizontal curve
is the relative revenue that the external attacker will receive
if he mines honestly. In the simulation with β′ = 0.25, the
relative revenue of the external attacker is still higher than the
relative revenue of the external attacker if he mines honestly.
Fig. 4(b) demonstrates that when β′ = 0.45, the external
attacker’s relative revenue is even less than that of honest
mining. Note that, the theoretical results predicted by the
external attacker in the two cases are the same. From the
external attacker’s perspective, the ratio of his computational
power to the original system’s computational power is 12 in
both 2 cases.
Table II shows the difference between the relative revenue
in external’s expectation and that in the simulation when
β′ = 0.25. The result suggests that the external attacker
cannot predict his block reward precisely before he launches
the attack. The higher influence factor γ2 is in the external
attacker’s prediction, the larger the gap is between the relative
revenue in external’s expectation and that in the simulation. In
this case, an error which is less than 15% is acceptable for the
external attacker since he can still earn some extra revenue by
launching an attack.
Table III shows the difference between the relative revenue
in external’s expectation and that in the simulation when
9TABLE II: Comparison between external attacker’s relative
revenue in the simulation and that in theoretic when β′ = 0.25.
γ2 Theoretical result Simulation result Error
0 0.33333 0.29441 -11.67734%
0.2 0.35384 0.30996 -12.40035%
0.4 0.37435 0.32504 -13.17319%
0.6 0.39487 0.34063 -13.73518%
0.8 0.41538 0.35655 -14.16162%
1.0 0.43589 0.37355 -14.30192%
β′ = 0.45. The error becomes unacceptable since it is lar/ower
of the internal attacker can seriously affect the decision of
the external attacker. When the internal attacker has a high
computational power which results in a larger β′ and a smaller
shrinkage factor ρ, the external attacker may launch an attack
against the original system with the computational power
which is far from enough.
TABLE III: Comparison between external attacker’s relative
revenue in the simulation and that in theoretic when β′ = 0.45.
γ2 Theoretical result Simulation result Error
0 0.33333 0.19036 -42.89060%
0.2 0.35384 0.20056 -43.31764%
0.4 0.37435 0.21361 -42.93750%
0.6 0.39487 0.22163 -43.871046%
0.8 0.41538 0.23104 -44.376730%
1.0 0.43589 0.24120 -44.664646%
VI. MULTI-ATTACKER SYSTEM
The former section has indicated that the external attacker
always overestimates his relative revenue before he launches
an attack against the original system. The gap between the
estimation of the relative revenue and the relative revenue
in real case becomes more and more unacceptable for the
external attacker when the internal attacker’s computational
power becomes larger.
Similar to the external attacker, after the external attacker’s
attack, the internal attacker’s relative revenue cannot meet his
expectation either. In this section, we will demonstrate how the
internal attacker notices the existence of the external attacker.
We also infers the reasons that both external attacker and
internal attack’s relative revenue do not meet their expectation.
Further more, we presents some countermeasures for the
internal attacker after he notices the external attacker.
A. The External Attacker’s Influence
We define three stage so as to demonstrate how much the
internal attacker lose and how the internal attacker notices the
existence of the external attacker.
1) Stage one: In stage one, the external attacker has not
launched an selfish mining attack against the original
system. The relative revenue of the internal attacker
corresponds with the internal attacker’s expectation.
2) Stage two: In stage two, the external attacker launches
the attack. The internal attacker notices the existence
of external computational power, but he has not been
aware that the external computational power is an at-
tacker. According to the probability that the external
computational power finds a block, the internal attacker
can easily estimate the entity’s computational power.
After normalization, the internal attacker’s computational
power is β1 in multi-attacker system. The internal attacker
makes a new expectation of his relative revenue according
to the value of β1.
3) Stage three: In stage three, the internal attacker notices
that his relative revenue is less than his expectation. This
fact indicates that the external computational power is an
attacker as well.
We conduct two specific cases to better illustrate the process
for the internal attacker to notice the existence of the external
attacker. To accord with the simulations in former sections,
in the first case, parameter β′ = 0.25 which results in
ρ = 0.82. The computational power of the external attacker
is 12 × ρ × αtarget so that after normalization, α = 35.64 ,
β1 =
1
5.64 and β2 =
1.64
5.64 . In the second case, β
′ = 0.45 and
ρ ≈ 0.63431. The external attacker’s computational power is
1
2 ×ρ×αtarget so that α ≈ 1126.34 , β1 ≈ 926.34 and β2 ≈ 6.3426.34 .
In the simulation of both cases, we use Monte Carlo method
to generate a blockchain with 106 blocks for 100 times.
Fig. 5(a) demonstrates the relative revenue of the internal
attacker when β′ = 0.25 in state one and stage two. In
stage one, the theoretical result is approximately equivalent
to the simulation result so that the internal attacker can
precisely calculate his relative revenue in stage one. In stage
two, the internal attacker has not noticed that the external
computational power is also an attacker. He calculates a new
expectation based on his new computational power β2. But
at stage two, his expected relative revenue does not hold the
relative revenue in the real case. Especially when γ1 > 0.5,
the expected relative revenue exceeds his relative revenue in
the real case.
Fig. 5(b) demonstrates the relative revenue of the internal
attacker when β′ = 0.45 in state one and stage two. In this
case, relative revenue of the internal attacker exceeds internal
attacker’s expectation.
Table IV and Table V show that, in both two cases, there is
a significant reduction of the original’s relative revenue from
stage one to stage two. The reduction of relative revenue let
the internal attacker be aware of the existence of the external
computational power. In stage two, the difference between
internal attacker’s relative revenue in real case and that in
expectation let the internal attacker be aware that the external
computational power is an attacker.
B. Reasons for Both Attackers’ Loss
Both the external attacker and the internal attacker’s ex-
pectations of their RR differs from their RR in the real case.
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(a)β′ = 0.25
(b)β′ = 0.45
Fig. 5: Relative revenue of the internal attacker in simulation
and in his expectation
TABLE IV: Comparison of the internal attacker’s relative
revenues when β′ = 0.25.
γ1 Stage two(real) Stage two(Expectation) Stage one
0 0.120 0.104(-13.672%) 0.196(62.65%)
0.2 0.133 0.123(-7.632%) 0.216(62.051%)
0.4 0.144 0.143(-0.459%) 0.239(65.584%)
0.6 0.158 0.165(4.412%) 0.262(66.136%)
0.8 0.168 0.184(9.121%) 0.282(67.163%)
1.0 0.181 0.205(12.751%) 0.304(67.461%)
TABLE V: Comparison of the internal attacker’s relative
revenues when β′ = 0.45.
γ1 Stage two(real) Stage two(Expectation) Stage one
0 0.424 0.350(-17.413%) 0.657(54.848%)
0.2 0.433 0.368(-14.880%) 0.653(52.685%)
0.4 0.444 0.390(-12.188%) 0.679(52.908%)
0.6 0.457 0.411(-10.140%) 0.685(49.846%)
0.8 0.462 0.430(-7.009%) 0.698(50.935%)
1.0 0.476 0.449(-5.663%) 0.699(46.869%)
Even internal attacker’s expected RR in stage two is sometimes
higher than his real RR in state two, there is a significant
reduction of his RR from state one to stage two.
The external attacker and the internal attacker’s wrong
expectations of their RR result from the fact that they use
the basic attacking model with a single attacker to predict
their RR. Some cases in the multi-attacker system are not
considered in attacking models with a single attacker.
1) Competition between attackers: Competitions, or forks
in the multi-attacker system not only exist between one
attacker(or both two attackers) and the honest miner, but also
exist between the external attacker and the internal attacker.
We define the competitions which include the honest miner as
Type one and the competitions between internal attacker and
external attackers as Type two.
Two type of competitions differ in how they are generated.
Type one competition results from the action Match of the at-
tackers and Type two competition results from action Override
of two attackers. We present a simple case study to make it
clear.
Fig. 6 demonstrates two specific cases of type one com-
petition and type two competition respectively. The dash line
in the figure means that the block is unreleased. In type one
competition, the honest miner release a newly found block
while one attacker(Either the internal attacker or external at-
tacker) is holding a unreleased block. After receiving the block
found by honest miner, The attacker takes action Match to
generate a fork in the blockchain. In type two competition, the
honest miner release a block while both two attackers have two
unreleased blocks. Both attackers take action Override. Neither
of them intends to form a competition in the blockchain, but
a unexpected competition is generated.
Fig. 6: Two type of competitions
Type two competitions are unexpected competitions. These
competitions waste the attackers’ computational power since
only one of the attackers’ released chain can be eventually
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accepted as the main chain by all miners. The blocks on
another unaccepted chain are staled.
2) Action Override made by another attacker: Unexpected
competitions waste attacker’s computational power, but action
Override made by another attacker harms the attacker more. In
mining attacker models with a single attacker, it is unnecessary
for the attacker to consider the risk that other miner will
override his released chain. But in our model, both external
and internal attacker have to worry about this risk.
Action Override of another attacker can be described as the
auction between external attacker and the internal attacker.
Fig. 7 is the simplest case in which the auction between the
attackers occurs. The dash line in the figure means that the
block is unreleased. Suppose in step one, the external attacker
holds two unreleased blocks and the internal attacker holds
three unreleased blocks. The honest miner releases a newly
found block. Suppose both attackers’ mining strategies are
selfish mining. Then, in step two, the external attacker takes
the action Override and the internal attacker takes the action
hold since he has not received the blocks released by the
external attacker yet. In step 3, the original received the blocks
released by the external attacker. So he takes action Override
as well.
Fig. 7: The auction between the attackers.
In this case study, two of the external attacker’s blocks
are staled and one of the honest miner’s block is staled. The
external attacker’s loss is more than the loss of honest miner.
3) Support from honest miner is split: Unexpected com-
petitions and auctions are two reasons that attackers wrongly
estimate their relative revenue. Besides, attackers’ influence
parameters γ1 and γ2 are always overestimated by themselves.
When attackers estimate of γ1 and γ2 in former sections,
they have not realized the existence of another attacker yet.
Suppose the fraction of computational power of the honest
miner affected by the attackers is γh. internal attacker and
external attacker will estimate his influence rate as γ1 = γh
and γ2 = γh.
Apparently, attacker’s overestimate of their influence rate
is another factor that causes attackers’ wrongly estimation of
their RR.
In our model, we calculate attacker’s real influence rate γ′1
and γ′2 based on the following three steps:
• Denote the fraction of computational power of the honest
miner affected by the attackers as γh. If there is a type
two competition in the blockchain, γh = 1.
• If the competition is a type two competition, γ′1 =
β1
β2+β1
,
and γ′2 =
β2
β2+β1
• If the competition is a type one competition, denote
the computational power of all attackers involved in the
competition as β. If internal attacker is in the competition,
γ′1 = γh × β1β and γ′2 = γh − γ′1. Otherwise, γ′1 = 0 and
γ′2 = γh.
C. Catfish Effect in Multi-attacker System
Due to the existence of the external attacker, the internal
attacker need to seek a better attacking strategy.
In section VI. B, we propose three reasons for the wrong
expectation of the internal attacker and the external attacker.
They are unexpected competitions, auctions between attackers
and overestimation of influence factor.
For the internal attacker, auctions between attackers are
inevitable because the external attacker’s state is unavailable
to the internal attacker.
But the influence factor of the internal attacker can be
increased. internal attacker’s overestimate of his influence
factor γ1 only exists in the cases that both attackers are involve
the competition. Note that a great part of these cases are
unexpected competitions.
The countermeasures of the internal attacker can be consid-
ered as a mining strategy which reduces unexpected competi-
tions and wastes other miner’s computational power.
1) Mining Honestly: An interesting fact is that, mining
honestly can be considered as an effective counter method.
As mentioned in Section V. A, the upper bound of the
computational power of the external attacker is 1−γ22−γ2 (β1+α).
This upper bound ensures that even in the worst case in which
the external’s computational power reaches its upper bound,
the internal attacker can earn as much revenue as he deserves.
The internal attacker can avoid unexpected competitions
by mining honestly. But he fails to waste the other miner’s
computational power.
2) Partial initiative release: We propose a new mining
attack strategy: partial initiative release(PIR). PIR is designed
for the mining attacker model with two or more attackers.
Similar to selfish mining, PIR’s state transition is based on a
state machine.
PIR is a strategy set which consists of
{PIR1, P IR2, · · · , P IRn, · · · }. Fig. 8 is the state machine
of PIR3. By demonstrating how PIR3 works, we explain
why PIR is suitable for multi-attacker system.
When the internal attacker is at state S = i, a block released
by honest miner results in the internal attacker’s state transition
from S = i to S = i− 1. A block found by internal attacker
himself results in the internal attacker’s state transition from
S = i to S = i+1. In one round of multi-attacker system, the
probability that an honest miner finds and releases a block is α,
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Fig. 8: The state machine of PIR3.
and the probability that the original miner finds a block is β1.
When the external attacker finds the block in one round with
probability β2, the internal attacker’s state does not change.
Different from state machine of selfish mining, the number
of states is finite. In PIR3, the max state is three. When the
internal attacker’s state is S = 3 and he finds the next block,
he will initiative release a block to ensure that his state does
not exceed three. When the honest miner releases a block, the
internal attacker will release all his three unreleased blocks.
Since the internal attacker will take the action Release in some
specific situation, we named this strategy as Partial initiative
release.
PIR3 cannot completely avoid unexpected competitions.
For example, when the internal attacker takes action Override
when S = 2 and the external attacker happens to take action
Override, an unexpected competition shows up.
But when S = 3 and the honest miner releases a block,
initiative releasing all three blocks can lower the probability of
unexpected competitions. We explain how initiative releasing
all blocks lowers the probability of unexpected competitions
by three cases:
1) External attacker’s state is lower than three. The external
attacker will take action Adopt which ensures that the
released blocks of internal attacker can be accepted by
all miners.
2) External attacker’s state is equal to three. the external
attacker will take action Match. Consider the case that
internal attacker takes action Hold instead of releasing
all three blocks. An unexpected competition will occur
if the honest miner finds and releases another block. In
unexpected competition, the two attackers take action
Override at roughly the same time so that the honest
miner’s support is split. But when internal attacker initia-
tive releases all three blocks and external attacker takes
action Match, the blocks of internal attacker are released
before external attacker’s. So most of the honest miners
receive and accept internal attacker’s blocks. In this case,
internal attacker gains more support from the honest
miner.
3) External attacker’s state is greater than three. As is indi-
cated in the former section, in this case, action Override
made by external attacker is inevitable. But the external
attacker’s Override prevents the internal attacker from
wasting more computational power.
D. Quantitative Analysis and Simulation
In this section, we analyze internal attacker’s countermea-
sures through simulations. We demonstrate when the internal
attacker should take countermeasures and which countermea-
sure should be taken.
In the simulations of this section, we set β′ as the variable.
Meanwhile γh is chosen from the set {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75}. The
shrinkage factor ρ = (α′+ β
′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 +
β′α′(β′−2β′2)
2β′3−4β′2+1 ). For a
more comprehensive explanation of the problem, we simulate
the cases with β2 = 1−γh2−γh ρ(α+ β1) and β2 =
1−γh
2−γh (α+ β1).
The two values of β2 is the upper bound and lower bound
respectively in Fig. 3.Meanwhile, β1 = β′(β1+α) and α+β1+
β2 = 1. When β2 is the upper bound, α =
(1−β′)(2−γh)
(1−γh)ρ+(2−γh) ,
β1 =
β′(2−γh)
(1−γh)ρ+(2−γh) and β2 =
(1−γh)ρ
(1−γh)ρ+(2−γh) . When β2
is the lower bound, α = (1−β
′)(2−γh)
3−2γh , β1 =
β′(2−γh)
3−2γh and
β2 =
1−γh
3−2γh .
1) β2 is the lower bound: We compare RRs of the internal
attacker when he takes different mining strategies including
selfish mining, honest mining and PIR3. We also present the
curve of β1 according to β′ as the baseline. With RR > β1,
the internal attacker can earn extra revenue.
(a) γh = 0
(b) γh = 0.25
(c) γh = 0.5
(d) γh = 0.75
Fig. 9: Internal attacker’s relative revenue when β2 is at the
lower bound.
Fig. 9 demonstrates the internal attacker’s relative revenue
when he takes different mining strategies including selfish
mining, honest mining and PIR3. We consider γh = 0 and
γh = 0.25 as low gammah values while γh = 0.5 and
γh = 0.75 as high γh values. In the four cases, when β′
is high, selfish mining outperforms honest mining and PIR3.
This result suggests that when β′ is high, the internal attacker
do not need to take any countermeasures. When β′ is low and
γh is low, honest mining is the best strategy and both selfish
mining and PIR3 is under the baseline. In the cases in which
β′ is low and γh is high, PIR3 beats other mining strategies
by a slight advantage. Table VI shows the best strategy among
selfish mining, honest mining and PIR3
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TABLE VI: The best strategy of the internal attacker when β2
is at the lower bound.
β′
γh Low High
Low Honest mining PIR3
High Selfish mining Selfish mining
2) β2is the upper bound: We compare RRs of the internal
attacker as well when β2is the upper bound.
(a) γh = 0
(b) γh = 0.25
(c) γh = 0.5
(d) γh = 0.75
Fig. 10: Internal attacker’s relative revenue when β2 is at the
upper bound
Fig. 10 demonstrate the internal attacker’s relative revenue
when he takes different mining strategies including selfish
mining, honest mining and PIR3. In the four cases, note
that the curve of honest mining always coincides the baseline.
When β2 is at the upper bound, internal attacker can ensure
that he can earn as many block rewards as he deserves by
mining honestly. Table VII demonstrates the best strategy
among selfish mining, honest mining and PIR3 in different
cases when β2 is at the upper bound. Table VII differs from
Table VI when β′ is high and ρ is low.
TABLE VII: The best strategy of the internal attacker when
β2 is at the upper bound.
β′
γh Low High
Low Honest mining PIR3
High PIR3 Selfish mining
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an attacking model in a proof-
of-work blockchain with an internal attacker and an exter-
nal attacker. Our model consists of two phase: the original
system and the multi-attacker system. From our theoretic
and quantitative analysis, we demonstrate the catfish effect
between the internal attacker and the external attacker. The
internal attacker has to improve his attacking strategy due
to the threat brought by the external attacker. We propose
an attacking strategy in multi-attacker system named Partial
Initiative Release (PIR). An interesting fact is that, mining
honestly is another countermeasure of the internal attacker.
Our simulation results shows that the original can select a
mining strategy among PIR, honest mining and selfish mining
based on the parameter β′,γh and β2.
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